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# THE REFORMED THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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# THE REFORMED THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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## Propositional Revelation the only Revelation

The object of this article is to counter the current notion that there is no such thing as "propositional revelation," and, on the contrary, to establish the fact that all revelation, insofar as it reveals God to us, is propositional.

### I

For some time now it has been fashionable to deny what is called "propositional revelation." The term has been coined by those who are opposed to the concept, and by it they appear to mean that revelation is not given to us by God in the form of truths couched in words, or propositions, but that all the revelation that God has given has come to us primarily as acts and events. Thus, Dr. Leonard Hodgson, former Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Oxford and Canon of Christ Church, writes: "The 'Word of God' is not a proposition or a series of propositions prescribing what we are to believe or think. It is a series of divine acts, when they are reflected on by the mind as it seeks to grasp their significance. The revelation of God is given in deeds; the doctrines of the faith are formulated by reflection on the significance of those deeds." Hodgson denies that there exists for us "revealed doctrine, presented by God, ready-made in propositional form." Hodgson goes on to argue that the "substitution of revelation in act for revelation in propositions" is a concept which solves some of the antinomies between philosophy and theology (*The Doctrine of the Trinity*, p. 22 ff.). Dr. John Burnaby, former Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge, in his lectures on *Christian Words and Christian Meanings* writes in the same strain.

The Right Reverend J. C. Vockler, of Adelaide, has traced the concept that revelation is in deeds and not in words to F. D. Maurice and Bishop Charles Gore, implicit in whose writings was the notion that "the Bible is not the revelation of God so much as the record of that revelation — and, more importantly, that God's revelation

is a self-disclosure in action. Revelation is through *events*, not in propositions." Archbishop William Temple argued in similar manner, and Vockler goes on to say that through Temple's writings "we are clearly rescued from the notion of propositional revelation, and our attention is focussed on the activity of God in history, both generally and specifically, as the mode of divine self-disclosure" (*Communitas*, 1959, p. 42 f.). Temple did indeed make a great deal of this denial of propositional revelation. In *Nature, Man and God* (p. 317) he asserted: "There is no such thing as revealed truth. There are truths of revelation, that is to say, propositions which express the result of correct thinking concerning revelation; but they are not themselves directly revealed." The explicit denial of "propositional revelation" may be traced back as far as George Tyrrell, the Roman Catholic modernist, who wrote: "Revelation is not a statement, but a showing . . . God speaks by deeds, not by words" (*Through Scylla and Charybdis*, p. 287).

## II

The denial of "propositional revelation" is the denial that God reveals Himself to men through the medium of words, that is to say, through meaningful statements and concepts expressed in words; for such is the only sense that can be given to the word "propositional" in this phrase. The denial that revelation is propositional in form, though widespread and repeated nowadays from writer to writer, runs counter to the biblical view of revelation. The view of the Bible is that revelation is essentially propositional. This may be established in two ways. First, by considering how the Bible describes revelation, and secondly by examining biblical revelation to see what in fact its nature is.

On the first point, it should be noted that the Bible regards words spoken and, in particular, written, as being the bearer of revelation. For example, St. Paul describes the Old Testament as the "oracles of God" (Rom. 3:2). It is the words of the Old Testament which are referred to as "oracles" (or *logia*). The same term is employed by St. Stephen in Acts 7:38, where the law at Sinai is described as "living oracles"; and the phrase "oracles of God" is used in Hebrews 5:12 and in 1 Peter 4:11. An oracle is a revelational utterance, or, in other words, a revealed truth. Its revelational character lies entirely in the words. The words may be descriptive of an event, or of a concept; but in both cases the words form propositions, and it is the proposition which is revelational, because it



is a proposition uttered by God. This is the meaning of the phrase, "oracle of God." The apostolic writers regarded the Old Testament as a series of oracles, of which God is the author, though different prophets and law-givers were the penmen. The concept would be commonplace to the Greek readers of the New Testament. (We need not, of course, follow the pagan Greeks in their unduly mechanistic concept of the methods of inspiration.) Nevertheless, the phrase "oracles of God" can imply nothing else than that the end-product, viz., the words uttered and written down, are God's words, and if God's words, then revelational of His mind and purpose, and so entirely properly called "His oracles." The biblical doctrine of revelation is concerned with the end-product—the words written down. Words written meaningfully are, of course, propositions. Yet it is such written words which the Bible avers to be "God-breathed" (2 Tim. 3:16). It is the written word, the Scriptures, which Christ declared cannot be broken (John 10:35). The gospel, which St. Paul says is God's power to save, is adumbrated in "holy scriptures" (Rom. 1:2). Saving wisdom comes through knowledge of these "holy scriptures" (2 Tim. 3:15).

An examination of the nature of revelation in Scripture confirms that this revelation very frequently is plainly in the form of propositions. For example, the opening verse of the Bible, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth," reveals one of the most fundamental facts in our knowledge of God and ourselves; and insofar as this verse is revelational (and it is profoundly so), it is because it is in the form of a proposition. No-one was present when the act of creation took place, to perceive it. The act in itself revealed nothing to us. Our knowledge that God is Creator is a revealed truth, and this revelation is exclusively propositional. The writer to the Hebrews affirms as much (Heb. 11:3). The same is true of all that has been revealed. for example, with regard to the Second Coming, or about Heaven and Hell. By the nature of things, such revelation must be propositional; for the action of the Second Coming has not yet taken place; while heavenly things cannot yet be experienced by men. Consequently, our knowledge of future events, or of heavenly supersensible realities, must be revealed to us propositionally, that is to say, through meaningful words, if we are to have any knowledge of them whatever. Yet the revelation which God has given us of the Second Coming, of the judgment day, and of Heaven and Hell, form a very large and important part of biblical revelation, and are all exclusively

propositional. We are enjoined in Scripture to orient our lives by these propositions about God's actions in the future. If they are not reliable and inerrant, this would be an improper injunction. Similarly, the knowledge of God's providence comes to us through propositions. For example, our Lord's statement that God is "Lord of heaven and earth" (Matt. 11:25) is a proposition. Yet by this title a profoundly important truth has been revealed to us. God's providence is not deducible by observation of events; though having been given to us through propositional revelation we can see this doctrine reflected in events. In the Bible God is constantly represented as revealing facts about Himself in propositional form, e.g., "I am the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob." All the great "I am" sayings of Christ, too, are propositions. Nor would these truths about Christ have been apprehended by the weak minds of men had they not been given as propositions. A great deal of the Old Testament revelation was given to the prophets in the form of vision. So characteristic is vision of prophecy that the whole book of Isaiah is described as "the vision of Isaiah" (Isaiah 1:1; 2 Chron. 32:32). In revelation through vision, the event (i.e., the vision itself) is not revelational, but it is the content of the vision (i.e., the concepts which God makes known through the vision) which is the bearer of revelation. These concepts are all apprehended by the seer and passed on to the hearer propositionally; that is to say, through meaningful words forming the concepts which God put into the mind of His servant. One of the most important revelations through vision is Daniel's vision of the Son of Man in Daniel 7. Both the vision itself, and the vital interpretation of it, cannot be described otherwise than as "propositional revelation."

### III

Hodgson's statement that the revelation of God is not given in words but in deeds minimises the fact that, if the deed is to be meaningful, it must be interpreted correctly; and that it is the interpretation which brings about the revelation. Hodgson's position, by confining revelation to deeds, and making the Bible merely a witness to the deeds and not itself part of the revelation, leads to foolish conclusions, self-evidently wrong. In his view, "the Word of God is a series of divine acts, to which the Bible bears witness . . . the revelation of God is given in deeds; the doctrines of faith are formulated by reflection on the significance of those deeds." Such a view means that the New Testament Epistles are excluded from being revelation.



They would be, according to Hodgson, the propositions formulated by the mind, as it reflects on the deeds of God and seeks to grasp their significance. A similar consideration applies to such statements of Christ as "God is a Spirit: and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth: for the Father seeketh such to worship him" (John 4:23, 24). This is a statement about God and His worshippers. To deny that this proposition is revelational, is foolish.

A further unfortunate consequence follows from the denial of propositional revelation. If the words of the Bible are made merely witnesses to the revelation of God, the unique position of the authority of the Bible is undermined, and it becomes merely one witness of no greater authority and of no more infallible a character than the other two witnesses which may be brought in at this point, namely, the witness of the Church and the witness of the human spirit and reason to the acts of God in experience. The dichotomy between event and the interpretation of the event, with the singling out of the former as the important element, or indeed as the sole element making up the revelation, leads, as might be expected, to the ignoring of the interpretation given in the Bible in favour of any interpretation which commends itself to the reader. Thus Brother George Every, S.S.M., writes of Father Herbert Kelly, the founder of his Community (and who "learnt almost everything first from Maurice"): "In his own reflections on the Old Testament Father Kelly had a way of going directly to the event, without even noticing the interpretation given by the prophet or the prophetic historian" (*The Gospel of God*, 1959, p. 34). It will be seen that if revelation is in the event rather than in the interpretation, revelation becomes like a nose of wax to be reshaped according to every man's whim. In fact, if revelation is only in event, then there is no revelation in the sense of God-given knowledge of God.

In the last resort, the concept that God's revelation is in deeds can only be maintained by a forgetfulness that God is all-sovereign over the world. The fact is that there is no event which God controls more than another and, therefore, every event is equally revelational of some aspect of His character. Yet to say this is to say that no event is revelational in itself. For example, God controlled the migrations of the Syrians from Kir and the Philistines from Caphtor as completely as He brought up the Israelites out of Egypt (Amos 9:7). What is it, then, that makes the tribal migrations of the Israelites pregnant with

revelation throughout the Old and New Testaments, while those of their related tribe, the Syrians, reveal only the one fact of God's general providence to which Amos alludes? Similarly, why are the invasions of neighbouring countries by the Assyrians, and the fate that overtook the Assyrians, revelational of God's character (see Isaiah 10), while the inter-tribal warfare of, say, the Maoris are not? It is not as though God's sovereign control is exercised any the more over the one, or any the less over the other, of these different events; but simply that to the one have been added interpretative propositions and statements, but not to the other. It is the proposition which carries the revelation, giving meaning to the event, to our minds. The event, by itself, reveals nothing. The conclusion is that revelation is essentially propositional. Modern theology largely ignores the doctrine of the sovereignty of God, and the important consequences of this are seen in modern theories of revelation. Temple saw the danger and sought to guard against it. His modern followers fall headlong into the pit. Temple's view of revelation has been summed up by Dr. Alan Richardson thus: "Revelation is due to the twofold form of the activity of God: God controls the historical events which constitute the media of revelation, and also inspires the minds of the prophets and thus enables them to interpret the events aright. 'He guides the process; He guides the minds of men; the interaction of the process and the minds that are alike guided by him is the essence of revelation'" (*Christian Apologetics*, p. 146). But God guides every event, every process. The new element is the infallible guidance of the prophet's mind so that he interprets the event aright. Thus it is the interpretation which is the revelation, and this interpretation is in the form of inerrant propositions. The biblical doctrine is that it is the work of the Holy Spirit not only to formulate these propositions in the mind of the inspired prophet, but to secure their embodiment in the written scripture. The activity of God in controlling events is continuous and unchanging (though the purposes of His control will vary); but the gift of interpreting the event aright is sporadic.

#### IV

For an event to be revelational, it must be interpreted by God Himself. This, and not merely some human reflection on the occurrence, is the real differentiating factor. God interprets through His Word, given in the form of propositions and statements about that event. Thus, for the prophets, the word of the Lord was not the event, but the interpretation of the event which had been given them



by the Spirit. The same is true of that supreme event, the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. There would have been no revelation in Christ's ministry, were it not for the interpretative statements of our Lord and His apostles. It is the proposition, then, that is the revelation, not the act itself.

Temple states, on the contrary: "the faith in which His early followers believed that they had found salvation did not consist in the acceptance of propositions concerning Him, nor even in acceptance of what He taught in words concerning God and man, though this was certainly included; but in personal trust in His personal presence, love and power" (*Nature, Man and God*, p. 311). This statement contains an inner contradiction. Faith cannot be exercised except towards propositions. Certainly, Christian faith (and in particular the disciples' faith) was not exercised towards propositions about material things, but towards propositions about a Person, His power and His promises. Nevertheless, the disciples' trust in Christ's "presence, love and power" was ultimately based on the acceptance of propositions about these things which had been formulated in their minds. The case is no different, though more obvious, with regard to those who "not having seen, yet have believed," for their knowledge of Christ's presence, love and power (from which their personal trust in Him springs) is conveyed to their minds exclusively by propositions. Trust in Christ is a religious experience which is a *consequence* of a revelation given and received ("He who comes to God must believe that he is"). This trust and religious experience is to be distinguished from revelation. Such experience of God is, of course, more than propositional; but the revelation on which it is based, and by which it must be judged, is essentially propositional. A confusion arises, unless the meanings of the word "knowledge" are clearly distinguished. Knowledge of God in the sense of revelation of Him, is entirely intellectual; it is apprehended by the mind alone. It is, therefore propositional. But knowledge of God in the sense of fellowship with Him, goes beyond intellectual apprehension, and is *experienced* through all the avenues of our being. In this latter sense, knowledge of God is not exclusively, or perhaps not even essentially, propositional; but this knowledge of God is not revelational, though it illuminates revelation and suffuses revelation. Yet such religious experience must be based on revelation, and be conformable to, and judged by, revelation, if it is to be regarded as true, and not spurious, knowledge of God. Revelation is the test and criterion of such religious experience, as to

whether it is knowledge of *God*, and the revelation which forms this test is the words of the Scripture and the propositions which these words form.

Denial of "propositional revelation" makes Christian faith impossible in its fullest and deepest expression of trust, for it is impossible to trust absolutely unless we have a sure Word of God. Such denial restricts Christianity to a religion of works, i.e., to following and obeying Jesus Christ as best we can. Moreover, denial of propositional revelation makes the lordship of Christ impossible of actual realisation, for it is only by the sceptre of His word that He can exercise that absolute lordship over men's consciences and wills which is His by right. For it is wrong to give absolute obedience to an uncertain command or to place absolute trust on an uncertain promise.

## V

Denial of propositional revelation goes hand in hand with a denial of inerrant revelation. An illustration of this may be taken from *The Christian in Philosophy* by Professor J. V. Langmead Casserley who writes (p. 190): "For the most part, the biblical conception of revelation is not propositional but historical. The God of the Bible is made known, or rather makes Himself known, not in words but in events. The Bible is not a series of saving propositions . . . but a propositional record of saving events. Its actual language, as is inevitable when human speech grapples with the problem of describing the singular, is partly adequate and partly inadequate." It is commonplace nowadays to assume, as Casserley does, that the words of the Bible, being human words, must inevitably (either through natural human inadequacy or the presence of sin) distort God's revelation. But the assumption ignores the power of God expressed in the divine rebuke, "Who made man's mouth?" (Exodus 4:11). To assert that its Creator (who saw all from the Beginning) cannot fulfil His purposes which He determined on from eternity, namely, to reveal Himself infallibly through human speech, betrays the greatest impiety.

It is sometimes further asserted that, from the nature of truth, it is impossible that there should be such a thing as inerrant revelation. A simple illustration will show the falsity of this. If when the clock strikes four, I state "The clock has struck four," I have made a propositional statement which is inerrant, if words mean anything; and this inerrancy remains characteristic of the proposition, even if (a) my hearer misheard me through deafness, (b) failed to apprehend my meaning through faulty knowledge of



English, or (c) there was no-one present to hear me. If it is possible for an ordinary human to make an inerrant proposition which is a revelational fact for those who have ears to hear, it is again the height of impiety to say that God cannot do so if He will; and not make one such inerrant proposition only, but to make a whole series of them within the pages of the Bible, and to exclude from among them any erroneous propositions, if He will. That God has in fact done so must be believed by all who give credence to the teaching and attitude of Christ and of His apostles (and, indeed, to the whole of Scripture itself) with reference to the character of Holy Scripture. The apostles explicitly affirmed that their words were the words of God, and that the propositions that they penned were verbally inspired by the Holy Spirit, e.g., "We teach not in words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Spirit teacheth" (1 Cor. 2:13), and "When ye received from us the word of the message, even the word of God, ye accepted it *not* as the word of men, but, as it is in truth, the word of God" (1 Thess. 2:13).

It is highly inconsistent, and springs from no discernible principle, that modern-day theologians should accept the authority of Christ and the apostles (and of Scripture in general) with regard to God and His relation to His creation, while rejecting that authority with regard to God's relation to part of that creation, namely, to the words of Scripture.

Sydney.

*Journal of Theology* Vol. 10, 1957. D. B. KNOX.

## Hermeneutics Today

Ernst von Dobschütz, writing in 1927, complained that the once flourishing discipline of hermeneutics had been painfully neglected in the previous two generations, and he urgently called for a new interest in the subject.<sup>1</sup> Writing a generation later, we might be inclined to complain of the very opposite. The literature concerning hermeneutics has become so vast that it is difficult to survey it. In August, 1950, Wolfgang Schweitzer offered a list of books and articles in the *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, under the title "The Problem of Biblical Hermeneutics in Contemporary Theology," which included eighty-seven items. That list has grown steadily since and is still growing.

What is hermeneutics? Schleiermacher, the "father" of modern hermeneutics as we might call him, defined it as the "art of understanding," i.e., of the thought content

1. *Vom Analogon des NTs*, p. 3, quoted by Fritz Barth, *Deigmatik*, I, 342.

of a literary composition,<sup>2</sup> and Wilhelm Dilthey, in his succession, defined it more precisely as an "artistic method of interpreting literary (written) documents."<sup>3</sup> This definition answers, in fact, the familiar examination question, "Is the subject under discussion an art or a science?" It is both. In Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, Demea says, "When I read a volume, I enter the mind and intention of the author: I become him, in a manner, for the instant; and have an immediate feeling and conception of those ideas, which resolved in his imagination, while employed in his composition."<sup>4</sup> In so far as interpretation is engaged in this kind of task, it is an artistic effort. This is what Schleiermacher had in mind when he spoke of "divination," by means of which the interpreter puts himself into the position of the author; in fact, transforms himself into the author by way of an imaginative effort. Dilthey, in his turn, applied the concept of "artistic perfection" in this context.<sup>5</sup> But hermeneutics is also a science, provided it is understood that we do not equate the term with "natural science." It is a science in so far as it relies for its results on method and verification. As a matter of fact, for Dilthey the core problem of hermeneutics was to find an answer to the question whether our understanding of the particular, as it presents itself in literary and historical documents, can be given general validity.<sup>6</sup>

The only method which can hope to satisfy this demand is the historical-critical method. It rests on the axiom of analogy, and it insists on the strictest possible canons of verification. Ernst Troeltsch gave this method its classical definition when he called "analogy" the key to criticism.<sup>7</sup> Of course, all human thinking relies on analogies and proceeds by way of analogy. As used by Troeltsch, however, the axiom of analogy implies for the historical scene what Vauvenargues said of nature generally: that it does not contradict itself.<sup>8</sup> It was in this spirit that David Hume, for instance, rejected the miracles which were attributed to the tomb of the Jansenist abbe Paris at St. Medard, notwithstanding the remarkable "cloud of witnesses" which supported them.<sup>9</sup>

2. Schl.'s Werke (Felix Meiner), vol. IV, 137.

3. Ges. Schriften, vol. V, 320.

4. Ed. Norman Kemp Smith, 2. ed., 1947, p. 155s.

5. The art of interpretation "entstand und erhaelt sich in der persoennlichen genialen Virtuositat des Philologen," Ges. Schr. V, 320.

6. "Ob das Verstaendnis des Singulaeren zur Allgemeinguelteigkeit erhoben werden kann?" Ges. Schr. V, 317.

7. *Beziehungen d. dogmat. Methode in der Theologie*, Ges. Schr. II, 732.

8. Oeuvres Choisis, ed. Classiques Garnier, Refl. et Maximes CCLXXXIX: "Il n'y a point de contradictions dans la nature."

9. Concerning the Human Understanding, Phil. Works, 1884, vol. II, 144.



Michel de Montaigne said of his contemporaries, "they stride over facts, but they diligently investigate their consequences. They usually begin thus, 'How can that be?' They should say, 'But is it so?' . . . I find that in almost every case we might say, 'That is not so.' And I should often make use of that reply, but I dare not . . ." <sup>10</sup> The first question simply accepts—on authority—the premisses of its subject of enquiry; the second question puts the very premisses to the test. In this we observe one of the most illuminating differences between the passing Middle Ages and the incipient Modern Age. Once people began to replace the question "How can that be?" by the new, more worrying question "Is it so?" they had passed the threshold of a new epoch. In the sixteenth century, Montaigne, as he admitted himself, still hesitated to identify himself openly with this change, but in the eighteenth century, G. E. Lessing listed its implications with unsurpassed penetration and courage, marking a position in the intellectual history of European man from which there is no return. In other words, as interpreters, the historical-critical method has become our destiny, and, as biblical interpreters in particular, this means that we cannot go back on Turretini's axiom that one set of hermeneutic rules applies to secular and sacred literature alike. <sup>11</sup>

Principally, this is recognised by all but the "fundamentalist." Historically, the fundamentalist is a hermeneutic straggler who still lives in the seventeenth century. His fear of legend and his constant preoccupation with apologetic rescue-work betray his dependence on an enemy who insisted that "true" is only what can be established as such by the canons of historical evidence. In that fearful state he looks for cover to the shelter of special pleading and the asylum of ignorance. What divides the "fundamentalist" from the rest is not so much a different view of Scripture (since both parties are agreed that it is the Word of God) as a difference in attitude to all that has happened in the advance of learning since the seventeenth century. On both sides, pre-hermeneutic commitments and evaluations determine the hermeneutic method. In short, the issue boils down to the question, whether it is legitimate for a biblical interpreter to take the post-Cartesian world picture into calculation in his interpretation or not. . . . In all honesty, we cannot be altogether out of

10. The Essays of Montaigne, tr. E. J. Trechmann, OUP, Bk. II, c.11, p. 498.

11. Dilthey, Ges. Schr. II, 134 and n. 1, De sacrae scripturae interpretandae methodo tractatus bipartitus, 1728; cp. also Kuhl, RGG, 3 ed., vol. I, 1230 concerning Jean Leclerc.

sympathy with the fundamentalist, for he is suffering acutely from the strain which the advance of knowledge in the last three centuries puts the biblical interpreter under, and, to a certain degree, we all suffer from it. On the other hand, it is an illusion for the fundamentalist to think that he "goes straight to the Bible" while the adherents of the historical-critical method have bowed to the spirit of the Modern Age and have introduced into their interpretation considerations alien to the Bible. No matter, whether one attacks the historical-critical method from a so-called "Biblicist" position or whether one insists with the reformers of the sixteenth century that the Scripture is its own interpreter, in both cases one will be guilty of ignoring some vital aspects in the structure of interpretation.

Admirable as the intention is to "go straight to the Bible," it is based on an illusion. And this is the case, not merely because of our unskilful handling of the art of interpretation and our disobedience to the Word of God. Even if we let nothing else come in between the Bible and us, we ourselves will be in the way. Or to put the same truth in a different way, man is an interpreter by nature. Just as he has no direct access to his environment in general, so he has also no direct access to the Bible; he has contact with the one as with the other only by way of interpretation. That interpretation will always stand between us and the Bible. What the "Biblicist" in fact does is really this. He blindly accepts the doctrinal or denominational assumptions of his environment or his own idiosyncrasies as the "key" with which he opens the Scriptures. He is a man so used to the customary interpretations of his group or to his own view of things that he has come to accept them as the only "reasonable" or "natural" meaning which the text can conceivably have for him.<sup>12</sup> He further forgets the simple truth that it is the interest of the reader which gives the text its focus and perspective. Applied to the Bible as a whole, this sets into motion a selective process which is not without its value-judgments, be they acknowledged or unacknowledged. Accordingly, the Bible has its focus for one reader in the Epistle of the Romans; for another in the Sermon on the Mount; and for yet another in the Book of Revelation or the Book of Daniel. In view of this, van der Leeuw has good reason to call the problem of interpretation

12. There is also a justified sense in insisting on the "natural and obvious meaning" of the text, as when Calvin, e.g., contrasts it with the "horror of paradoxes and tricks of argument." Vid. John T. McNeill, *The Significance of the Word of God for Calvin*, *Church History*, June 1959, p. 134.



"formidable." What does the Bible say? Everything and nothing! And he quotes in this context Chesterton's *The Innocence of Father Brown*, "When will people understand that it is useless for a man to read his Bible unless he also reads everybody else's Bible?"<sup>13</sup>

In view of this situation, the question immediately presents itself, Does this not introduce an appallingly subjective element into the business of interpretation? Last century, when writing on the subject of hermeneutics, Landerer spoke, in a suggestive phrase, of "interests opposed to the Bible."<sup>14</sup> It reminds us that one can bring wrong interests to the Bible just as one can put wrong questions to a text. How then can we achieve that "objectivity" for our interpretation which Dilthey postulated for its general validity? In attempting an answer to this question we must remind ourselves once more that the element of "subjectivity" will inevitably enter any process of interpretation. The interpreter of literary and historical documents is quite differently "engaged" in his subject than the natural scientist, and consequently he must not even strive to emulate the "objectivity" of the natural scientist. There is no point in lamenting this "risk" of subjectivity, for it is the price at which alone interpretation can be had. This being the case, Bultmann is perfectly justified in saving "the demand that the interpreter must silence his subjectivity and extinguish his individuality, in order to obtain objective knowledge, is the most absurd that can be imagined."<sup>15</sup> And when Gerald Heard says, "those who make no attempt to understand, distort least," he is talking nonsense. He ought to have said, "those who dare not distort, understand nothing."<sup>16</sup>

What then are "interests opposed to the Bible" and what is the criterion for the "right" kind of interest? Many a contemporary theologian would be inclined to quote Bultmann's attempt to rediscover Heidegger's "Existential" categories<sup>17</sup> in the New Testament as a blatant example of an "interest opposed to the Bible." Thieliicke, for instance, confronts in this context "principles alien to the Bible," such as Heidegger's philosophy as well as Kantianism and Idealism, with the "*facultas se ipsam interpretandi*" of Scripture.<sup>18</sup> This is not the place to

13. *Religion in Essence and Manifestation*, 439.

14. Herzog's *Realenzyklopaedie*, I. ed., vol. 5, 781.

15. *Essays Philosophical and Theological*, p. 255.

16. *The Ascent of Humanity*, p. 26.

17. Strictly speaking, "Existenzialien," for H. distinguishes btw, "categories," applicable to the world of objects, and the former, applicable to the human condition, cp. *Sein u. Zeit*, 1953, 44.

18. *Kerygma & Myth*, ed. H. W. Bartsch, vol. I, 187s.

discuss the rights and wrongs of Bultmann's use of Heidegger; the question is rather whether a philosophical tool extraneous to the Bible is eo ipso "alien" to it as well. The answer to that question must be definitely no, for an affirmative invalidates not only the whole history of theology; it also lacks realism. Here Bultmann is more realistic than Thielicke when he points out that every interpreter depends at least in an unreflective and uncritical manner on some philosophical tradition or other. And I should say that he is setting us an example when he demands of himself ruthless honesty in the matter. In view of our knowledge of the influence of the Jewish and Hellenistic environment on the formulation of the Christian message, it is at least advisable to take cognizance of the problematic nature of such terms as "extraneous" and "alien," when applied to our biblical interpretation. If it was "right" for the apostle Paul to avail himself of gnostic concepts, then Bultmann should be able to claim an equal "right" of availing himself of Heidegger's philosophy as a matter of principle. For just as Paul did not become a "gnostic" by his use of gnostic categories, so it is at least conceivable that Bultmann has not reduced the Gospel to existentialism by his use of Heidegger. That this might be the case, or at least partly the case, does not affect the principle as such.

What is it then about the faculty of Scripture to be its own interpreter to which Thielicke appeals? Does it furnish us with the criterion of what is the right kind of interest in our interpretation of Scripture? Thielicke refers here, of course, to the well-known reformation principle. In its historical context it was formulated in reaction to an ecclesiastical tradition of dubious value; and in so far as it reminds us that we must seek in Scripture nothing but the Word of God, it has an inalienable right to be respected as a criterion of objectivity. And yet there is an aspect to this axiom which is questionable in itself. I have not primarily in mind points raised by Roman Catholic controversialists such as the presence of obscurities in Scripture or the charge that the Protestant interpreters use their own church doctrines as criteria for their interpretation. These points are too obvious to be denied by a generation of theologians whose distance from the controversial scene ought to afford them some measure of detachment. It is notorious that Luther's insistence on the "sola gratia" and "sola fide" prevented him from doing justice to such writings as the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Epistle of James, and the Book of



Revelation. And in the case of Flacius the axiom of the Scripture as its own interpreter did not prevent him from going entirely astray in his views concerning the natural state of man, as Dilthey was quick to point out.<sup>19</sup> No, in this context I am concerned with yet another aspect of this axiom, and that is the fact that here we are dealing with metaphorical language. For, strictly speaking, Scripture is by no means its own interpreter. When we refer to it as an "interpreter" and when we speak of its "faculty of interpreting itself" we are using anthropomorphisms. The Scriptures are a book or a set of writings, and they are not a human person. A book can never be its own interpreter. When we say, "the Bible says . . ." or "the Bible speaks to us," we are talking figuratively, using terms which belong to human intercourse. Unless we address the Bible with our interests it remains silent. In short, the Bible "speaks" to us only when we interpret it; and here the whole emphasis must be placed on the fact that *we* are doing the interpreting, with all that this implies. That is, our assumptions tacit or deliberate; our commitments, acknowledged or unacknowledged; and the risk of error and distortion, no matter whether we are conscious of it or oblivious to it. And these hard facts are not invalidated by the observation that, strictly speaking, it is not the Scripture but the Holy Spirit in Scripture who is his own interpreter.<sup>20</sup> This is not the place to explore the precise meaning of this doctrinal statement, but so much ought to be clear, the belief that the Holy Spirit is the true interpreter of Scripture and the conviction that without his aid the Bible cannot be accepted by us as the Word of God, cannot be harnessed by us to do the work of a hermeneutic tool. A "pneumatic" exegesis or method of interpretation which "harnesses" the Holy Spirit for its exposition is a contradiction in terms, for the simple reason that it is of the essence of a method to be a tool which is at our disposal whenever we turn to it, while the Spirit "bloweth where it listeth." In other words, it is jealous of its divine sovereignty and freedom; or, as Bultmann would say, it is "unverfügbar" or an "eschatological" event. The truth of the axiom lies in the recognition that it is an experience of divine grace when our interpretation of biblical texts brings us in touch with the Word of God.<sup>21</sup> Or, to put it

19. Dilthey, *Ges. Schr.* II, 123. Cp. Kuhl, *BGG*, 3. ed., vol. I, 1229.

20. "Spiritus Sanctus est autor Scripturae principalis summus. ergo etiam est ejusdem interpres authenticus" (Johann Gerhard), *Hutterus Redivivus*, 12. ed., 1883, par. 42, p. 95. n.5.

21. Here lies the truth of E. Dinkler's observation that the Word of God is operative in the Bible, but not a quality of it, *BGG*, 3. ed., vol. I, 1189.

differently, whenever our interpretation releases the Word of God, we are experiencing a "charismatic" event.<sup>22</sup> But as a hermeneutic tool the axiom of the self-interpreting Scripture can never replace the historical-critical method.

The "objectivity" of the Word of God is then an experience of grace which may or may not be released by an "objective" interpretation of the text itself. On this level the axiom of analogy and the strict canons of verification which go with it are operative. But that is not all. For it must be supplemented by the most meticulous determination of text and context, because no text can be understood apart from its context. The scholastic habit of using the Bible as quarry for disconnected proof-texts stands condemned before a more adequate appreciation of the true nature of biblical texts. Equally condemned stands the habit of a contemporary preacher to use a biblical text as "pretext" for a discourse on whatever happens to float through his mind on Saturday night. The task of determining the relation of text and context presents itself on different levels. First of all, we must pay attention to "the importance of considering the sentence in the paragraph, the paragraph in the chapter, and the chapter in the volume, if our interpretations are not to be misleading, and our analysis arbitrary."<sup>23</sup> On another level, the problem of text and context meets us in the task of defining the historical setting which gave birth to the text. Gunkel called it the "Sitz im Leben," and Schleiermacher used the term "Lebensmoment" in this connection.<sup>24</sup> On yet another level, the same problem confronts us when we seek to determine the relation of the biblical writings to the cultural environment of the Ancient Near East and the Hellenistic Age.<sup>25</sup> And so on, until, on the theological level, it becomes an issue between Scripture and Tradition.<sup>26</sup> But no matter on what level we are pursuing the task of determining the relation of text and context, we are inevitably forced to move in a circle. This fact has received its full attention in the hermeneutic literature. Schleiermacher and Dilthey, for instance, gave their particular attention to the fact that "every part of a literary text requires the whole to make it intelligible, while the whole in turn can only be understood in terms of the parts."<sup>27</sup> Bultmann and H. Braun have given their attention to the

22. Cp. H. W. Wolff, *Ev. Th.* 1956, Heft 8/9, p. 340.

23. Ogden and Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning*, 1956, p. 226.

24. Schl. 's *Werke* (Felix Meiner), vol. IV, 140.

25. Both Flaccius Illyricus and Hugo Grotius had insisted at their time on the importance of the context.

26. Cp. Daniel Jenkins, *Tradition and the Spirit*.

27. H. A. Hodges, *Wilhelm Dilthey, An Introduction*, 1944, p. 27.



circle in the relation of the New Testament to its environment,<sup>28</sup> and Tillich takes account of it from the theological side.<sup>29</sup> On whatever level these interpreters come into contact with this hermeneutic circle, they are agreed that, rightly handled<sup>30</sup> it need not degenerate into a "circulus vitiosus." H. A. Hodges, when summarising Dilthey's view in the matter, says, "the circle is logically unbreakable, but we break it in practice everytime we understand. We glance roughly over the parts and get from them a first impression of the whole . . . We go to and fro in this way between part and whole until we have an interpretation which is coherent in itself."<sup>31</sup> In a similar manner we proceed on all levels when we are forced to move in the hermeneutic circle. Under these circumstances we must take Heidegger's advice to heart. The important thing is not to get out of the circle, but to get into it in the right fashion.<sup>32</sup>

It is in this circle, in conjunction with the axiom of analogy, that the historical critical method achieves its measure of "objectivity." The result of that objectivity is a better understanding of the biblical documents as part of Religionsgeschichte or phenomenology of religion. At this stage, the biblical interpreter appears to be faced with a dilemma. He has a method for what he is ultimately not interested in, or only in a preliminary manner, while he has no method for what is his ultimate concern, i.e., the Word of God. In fact, the dilemma is not new. The setting of the Word of God in the phenomenology of religion (theologically speaking, its Incarnation) has presented its difficulties to the Christian interpreter right from the beginning. Paul, for instance, brushed aside an uncomfortable manifestation of it in cavalier fashion when he declared that God does not concern himself with oxen (1 Cor. 9:9). The history of allegorical interpretation offers countless examples of dealing with this dilemma. Apart from other attractions, this method proved a convenient instrument for tuning the biblical texts to the spiritual tone which the interpreter expected of them. In addition, it has a remarkable facility of keeping texts "contemporary." But the days of the allegorical method are gone; it carries no longer any conviction with us. At one time indispensable, it is now useless.<sup>33</sup>

28. Bultmann, *Glauben u. Verstehen*, II, 223; H. Braun, *RGG*, 3. ed., vol. I, 1686.

29. *Systematic Theology*, vol. I, 150.

30. Cp. Ogden's and Richard's six canons of symbolism, to avoid "circular motion," op. cit. 107.

31. H. A. Hodges, op. cit. 27.

32. *Sein und Zeit*, 1953, p. 153.

33. Dilthey, V, 322 and Bultmann, *Glauben u. Verstehen*, vol. I, 336.

It is, of course, well known that the allegorical method was not the only alternative to a literal interpretation of Scripture in the history of the Church. It was supplemented by the typological method. And here the matter stands differently in the contemporary theological scene, for this method has still its advocates today. Quite recently, the merits of its use have been the subject of a spirited discussion, particularly among Old Testament scholars, with Gerhard von Rad (Heidelberg) and F. Baumgärtel (Erlangen) as the chief spokesmen for and against it.

What is typology? In answering this question we are somewhat hampered by different uses of the term.<sup>34</sup> We proceed, perhaps, best by comparing it with allegory. Allegory, as a method of interpretation (not to be confused with allegory as a literary form) assumes "that the most real thing, that which is to be demonstrated, illustrated or inculcated, is something abstract, while the image, the personification, is created for the sake of the abstraction, and points only thither."<sup>35</sup> In the Biblical context this means that the allegorist is, if not embarrassed by, at least not interested in the historical setting of the Biblical message.

Typology is both alike and unlike the allegorical method. It shares its preoccupation with analogies and correspondences, and it, too, wishes to carry the reader from the world of the sensible to that of the spirit. In contrast to the allegorical method, however, it accepts the media of time and history as proper channels of God's revelation to man. Unlike the allegorist, the typologist does not wish to escape from the historical medium to a realm of timeless truth. He turns to the study of correspondences and analogies in order to receive some clarity about the historical events themselves. Underlying his method is the conviction of a fundamental identity or similarity in structure of past and present events in the history of salvation. He explores the past for "types" in order to throw light on the as yet undefined meaning of the present and the future. This is how the authors of the New Testament writings went about in their typology; and still in the seventeenth century a man like Coccejus used the "types" of the Old Testament to interpret the events of the Thirty Year War and the reign of Cromwell.<sup>36</sup> To-day, interpreters who use this method will confine themselves to tracing analogies between the two Testa-

34. Cp. D. W. Allen's complaint in *Theology*, Febr. 1958, p. 61.

35. Basil Willey, *The Seventeenth Century Background*, 1949, p. 62.

36. Emanuel Hirsch, *Geschichte der neuern evangelischen Theologie*, 1915, vo. I, 238.



ments. In other words, they reduce the task of typology mainly to the function of stating the unity of the biblical message.

As the historical-critical method, so typology operates with the axiom of analogy.<sup>37</sup> Yet there is an important difference. The analogies which the historical-critical method calls in are open for inspection to believer and unbeliever alike; the analogies of the typological method are accessible to the believer only. Here lies the problematic nature of the use of this method in its contemporary setting.<sup>38</sup> Gerhard von Rad has defended it on the ground that typology is part of the elementary structure of human thought.<sup>39</sup> In support of this thesis he refers to the world of proverbs and the field of poetry. Accordingly, he defines typology as "interpretative thinking in analogies."<sup>40</sup> In his use of the method he is not so much interested in the geographical and historical data of the Old Testament as in what he calls the "credenda," i.e., the faith of Israel as it has been handed on in the various strands of tradition.<sup>41</sup> Of the number of possible "types," he says that they are "without limit."<sup>42</sup> Concerning the handling of the method he warns us that no rigid rules can be laid down, since it is essentially a matter of the freedom of the Holy Spirit.<sup>43</sup> This observation naturally raises the question, If that is the case, is there any point in speaking of typology as a hermeneutic method at all? Is this not a covert admission that the historical-critical method is the only method available to us and that it is an experience of grace when in the course of its application to the biblical documents we are led from the realm of "Religionsgeschichte" into the presence of the Word of God?

F. Baumgärtel quite frankly discards the typological method as an instrument of interpretation. He feels that it is alien to the mentality of modern man, and he doubts that it carries any conviction with us to-day. In other

37. G. von Rad, *Typologische Auslegung des ATs*, *Ev. Th.* 1952, Heft 1/2, p. 21.

38. In this connection the following remarks by a Roman Catholic scholar are of particular interest. J. L. McKenzie writes in *J.B.L.*, Sept. 1958, 201: "Typology is so much a part of the traditional Catholic interpretation of the Bible that it cannot be abandoned by the modern scholar. The encyclical (of Pius XII in 1943) speaks of the necessity of continuing typological interpretation." But McK. adds, "Most exegetes recognise that the traditional typology of the Fathers of the Church cannot be combined with modern scientific study and that typology must be redefined before it can be employed in our interpretation. This work has not been done."

39. "Eine Elementarfunktion alles menschlichen Denkens und Deutens," *Ev. Th.* 1952, Heft 1/2, p. 17.

40. "Deutendes Analogiedenken," *loc. cit.*

41. *op. cit.*, p. 32.

42. *op. cit.*, p. 31.

43. *op. cit.*, p. 33.

words, it fails to make an effective appeal to our sense of truth.<sup>44</sup> On the other hand, he believes that the scheme of "promise" and "fulfilment" can serve the purposes for which the New Testament relied on the typological method, i.e., to help us get hold of the truth that in Jesus Christ the promise of the Old Testament has come true.<sup>45</sup>

As a matter of fact, even Gerhard von Rad has considered the possibility of abandoning the term "typology," if not the method itself.<sup>46</sup> And when he adds that the typological method must abandon and transcend the "Selbstverständnis" (shades of Bultmann!) of the Old Testament text,<sup>47</sup> then we cannot help feeling that the whole discussion concerning typology has helped to obscure the real measure of agreement among interpreters of the Old Testament and that it has run itself fast in a controversy over a highly compromised term. And when we further consider that an associate of von Rad's, H. W. Wolff, has defined typology as "Heilsgeschichte" viewed in terms of "example"<sup>48</sup> and that he calls in the support of Ernst Fuchs, a pupil of Bultmann's, for his definition,<sup>49</sup> and when we finally compare this with the fact that Baumgärtel quotes Rm. 15.4 as the basis of what might be regarded as the true function of typology,<sup>50</sup> then the difference of opinion among the contesting parties does not appear to be so very great after all.

Of course, at no stage in the controversy over the typological method did the issue present itself as a choice between typology and the historical-critical method as two exclusive alternatives. Gerhard von Rad and his associates are themselves past masters in the art of the historical-critical method. The question was rather whether typology can claim a legitimate place beside the historical-critical method. As such its task would be theological rather than exegetical. That the work of the historical-critical method must be supplemented by theological reflection, F. Baumgärtel by no means denied, and we have seen that he does this kind of work by employing the scheme of

44. *Verheissung*, 1952, p. 83: "... weil wir diese exegetische Art als fuer uns vollig fremdartig und als uns in keiner Weise zwingend empfinden muessen" and p. 83s: "Fuer uns heute kann, um der ganz schlichten Wahrhaftigkeit willen, die Aussage des ATs nur in ihrer historischen Bedingtheit als fuer unseren Glauben relevant erfasst werden."

45. *Verheissung*, p. 83. N. B. Bgtl strictly distinguishes btw. "promise" and "prophecy," op. cit., pp. 23 and 35.

46. *Ev. Th.* 1952, Heft 1/2, p. 33.

47. "Selbstverständnis" equals "understanding of self" equals interpretation of the human condition.

48. *Ev. Th.* 1956, Heft 8/9, p. 362.

49. Ernst Fuchs, *Hermeneutik*, 1954, p. 200: "Der neue Sinn der Vergangenheit gibt sich nur 'exemplarisch' her."

50. *Verheissung*, p. 78.



promise and fulfilment. And it need hardly be stressed that the biblical interpreter cannot do without this kind of reflection, unless he hands himself over to "Religionsgeschichte" altogether. But a twofold warning must be added. First, he must resist the temptation of identifying his theological reflection with the Word of God itself; and secondly, he must refrain from committing himself too exclusively to one particular method of theological reflection.

Basil Willey, when referring to the allegorical method of interpretation, remarks that it makes "two vicious assumptions," one of which is, that "Scripture is homogeneous throughout."<sup>51</sup> Unfortunately, this assumption happens to be made, perhaps more tacitly than deliberately, when other schemes of interpretation come into play, be it "promise and fulfilment," the dialectic of law and gospel, an "eschatological" or a "kerygmatic" interpretation. In all these cases we observe a tendency for the interpretation to slide into a more or less narrow groove, with the result that the Biblical message keeps repeating itself with the monotony of the latest "hit." Lampe has, therefore, done well to remind us that "amid the fashionable enthusiasm for the present-day rediscovery of the unity of Scripture we must not forget that there is diversity" and that "we should be on our guard against ignoring it. The unity of the Bible ought never to mean the same thing for us as for the pre-critical generations."<sup>52</sup> And H. W. Wolff, after stating the merits of typology, concludes in a spirit of exemplary detachment with the observation that any one particular method can at best lay bare a fraction only of the immeasurable wealth of the biblical texts in their diversity.<sup>53</sup> But whatever the function of each individual method of theological interpretation happens to be, the ultimate aim of all of them must be obedience to the Word of God.

H. H. REX.

51. *The Seventeenth Century Background*, p. 65

52. *Essays on Typology*, p. 17.

53. *Ev. Th.* 1956, Heft 8/9, p. 338: "Jedes derartige hermeneutische Prinzip gibt bestenfalls einen Bruchteil der Texte das Wort frei."

## Book Reviews

### FROM ROUSSEAU TO RITSCHL

Being the translation of eleven chapters from *Die protestantische im 19 Jahrhundert*.

By Karl Barth. Translated by Brian Cozens. Library of Philosophy and Theology (S.C.M. Press, London), 1959, pp. 435; 42/-.

When Professor in Münster and Bonn, Karl Barth lectured on the history of modern Protestant theology, following the custom of German faculties which offer such a course as an important supplement to the lectures on dogmatics and history of dogma. These lectures, first published in 1947, dealt in nine chapters with the theology of the 18th century, followed by 19 chapters on the 19th century from Schleiermacher to Ritschl. The present English book contains seven chapters from the introductory part and only four (Schleiermacher, Feuerbach, Strauss, Ritschl) from the main part. This selection is reasonable because some stars of the galaxy of the 19th century are of third or fourth magnitude and have not shone in the English speaking world which, incidentally, raises the question whether we shall ever possess a history of modern theology which would cover not only Germany and Switzerland, but also the French and English speaking world, the Netherlands and Scandinavia. In making their selection, the editors have shifted the emphasis from the 19th to the 18th century, and thus put into the foreground the great problem of the relationship between philosophy and theology. Thus they have given to the English public one of the finest works ever written in this field.

A later biographer of Barth may try to explain the predilection of this archenemy of the misunderstanding of the Christian faith by modern Protestant theology for the 18th century that has produced this misunderstanding. Barth's remarkable interest in, and knowledge of, the age of Enlightenment is known to every reader of his *Die Kirchliche Dogmatik* (e.g. vol. III, I where p. 465 even his beloved Mozart, "the incomparable," appears as the climax of the music of all times till now). The opening chapter of this book, one of three important chapters of the German edition, on "Man in the Eighteenth Century" describes this man as the man of "absolutism" in the broadest sense. The chapter on Rousseau belongs to the best essays on the life and thought of this great Frenchman who also belongs to Switzerland. Lessing, Kant, Herder, Novalis and Hegel (a chapter on Goethe was planned for the original book, but never finished) are the great representatives of German thought on the border of philosophy and theology. They are followed by the comprehensive genius Schleiermacher, the radical atheist Feuerbach, the unfortunate D. F. Strauss and Ritschl whose "rounded, transparent and compact . . . train of thought" attracted followers, but has not given birth to an epoch as the theology of Schleiermacher did. The chapters are of unequal length according to the importance of the subject and the interest of the author. They are all informative, most of them even very stimulating as it may be expected if the greatest theological thinker of our time reveals something of his encounter with great minds of the past. There is a strong autobiographical element in these essays as every reader of Barth's books will feel.

The most important chapters for the systematic theologian are naturally those on Kant, Hegel and Schleiermacher. It is impossible to discuss them here. Barth shows how Kant, standing on the border of philosophy and theology, does not claim that his interpretation of



religion as phenomenon of reason leaves no possibility of any revelation, "since it might be after all, that the teachings of revelation stem from men supernaturally inspired" (quoted from "Disputation of the Faculties" on p. 193). Kant who never went to church recognised the existence of the Church which has its foundation in the Bible. Hence he envisaged "the possibility of a theology which would be different from the philosophical theology he himself was propounding. He explicitly calls this other theology, which limits philosophical theology, 'biblical theology', and it is his wish that the affairs of this biblical theology should not be 'allowed to mingle' with those of philosophy" (p. 192). In the case of Schleiermacher Barth emphasises rightly Schleiermacher's profound interest in the Church, and rejects E. Brunner's criticism for Schleiermacher's understanding of religion as mysticism. While he describes with great sympathy the attempt of Schleiermacher to reconcile Christianity with modern culture ("Shall the knot of history be thus loosed: Christianity with barbarism and learning with unbelief?" quoted p. 321), he shows why the great thinker was not able to retain the objective Word of God, the reality of Christ and the biblical understanding of sin and grace. The tragedy of idealistic philosophy in its attempts to interpret the Christian faith is made clear in the chapter on Hegel. It would have become still clearer if the development of the school of Hegel had been taken in account which ended in the final breakdown of metaphysics in European philosophy and in the claims of modern Communism that Marx and Lenin are the legitimate heirs of Hegel's philosophy, and that Marxist Communism is the necessary product of Western, Christian civilisation.

This outstanding book will find many grateful readers. The translation is good, even misprints in the German text have been corrected. Schleiermacher's "Glaubenslehre," the popular name for his main work *Der Christliche Glaube* should not be rendered with "Doctrine of Faith," but with the English title (see p. 424) "The Christian Faith," to avoid misunderstandings.

H. SASSE.

### SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

By L. Berkhof (Banner of Truth Trust, London), 1959, pp. 784; 41/6 Aust.

Professor of Dogmatic Theology at Calvin Seminary, Grand Rapids, Michigan (1906-44), Dr. Berkhof, who died as recently as 1957, represented in America the Dutch Neo-Calvinist tradition of Kuyper blended with the kindred Old Presbyterian School of Hodge. Published originally a quarter of a century ago, this British edition of his major work, reproducing the American of 1941, will make this already extensively used text book more widely accessible.

Throughout the theologising seeks to be Biblically based, the erudition is wide, the logic is cogent and the style perspicuous. The writer has the gift of pointed antithetical expression. E.g., "Christ pleads our cause with God, while the Holy Spirit pleads God's cause with us" (p. 401). However, with its rather rigid text-book arrangement and manner, the work is somewhat lacking in the fresh insights and originality of the comparable *Reformed Dogmatics* of Herman Bavinck, the author's older Dutch contemporary. The customary sequence in general schematisation is followed:—The Doctrines of God, Man and Sin, Person and Work of Christ, Holy Spirit (Application of Redemption), Church and Means of Grace, Eschatology. As distinctive of the school of Calvinism to which he adheres Berkhof in rejecting ~~theologian~~ *notion* ~~is~~ *strongly asserts* the validity of the concepts of

general revelation and common grace. The section on the Church and the Means of Grace especially reaches a high level of sustained theological writing, particularly in the section on Baptism which in certain respects anticipates Cullmann's *Baptism in the New Testament*. Surprisingly, however, although the position of Reformed Orthodoxy is assumed throughout, a very serious lacuna exists in the total synopsis of the work in that no adequate consideration nor serious discussion is given to the subject of the Rule of Faith, to the Doctrine of Holy Scripture as to its nature and authority (The very brief chapter, "The Word as a Means of Grace," pp. 610-4, does not really deal with this subject). In recent years the subject of ecclesiology has been much in the centre of theological discussion but discerning minds are increasingly recognising that attention must be demanded and concentrated on the more basic theme (as its strange omission here indicates) of Holy Scripture as the Word of God.

Misstatements occasionally are made. E.g., *The Marrow of Modern Divinity* was not "written in Scotland" (p. 212) and the Authorised Version appears strangely designated as "The St. James . . . Version" (p. 684).

Questions for further study and references to relevant literature are added to the chapters and a comprehensive Bibliography is appended at the end of the book. Three indexes are added—to authors (very incomplete), subjects and Scriptural texts. This volume provides a useful conspectus of Reformed Dogmatics for the student, a valuable feature being the frequent reference to Dutch theological sources often inaccessible to the English reader. The publishers are to be commended on issuing so early in their career this major project in attractive format at such a moderate price.

R. SWANTON.

#### SYMBOLISM IN THE BIBLE AND THE CHURCH

By Gilbert Cope (S.C.M. Press, London), 1959, pp. 288; 30/-.

This is an exciting and exasperating book.

On the one hand, there is a fascinating account of symbolism in general and typology in particular. The author's account of ecclesiastical art in the Early Church is both learned and instructive. The author has some valuable things to say, and he says them well. Many of his *obiter dicta* are intriguing and suggestive. For example, he refers, in passing to the Disney world of fabulous animals, and he makes this penetrating observation: "The mountain of applied science has laboured and brought forth a Mickey—a mythical creature who has the morals of neither mouse nor a man—an optical illusion which is the projection of modern man's uncertainty concerning his own status, and a symbol of his recognition of kinship with the animal world" (p. 17).

On the other hand, there is an irritating dependence on the more extravagant speculations of Frazer and Jung. "We must take our spades," he writes, "to two fields—that of ancient mythology and that of modern psychology" (p. 88), and he digs deep. The author's enthusiasm for mythology and psychology exceeds his devotion to Biblical truth. What is our criterion for faith and practice? Is it, quite simply, the acceptance of the Word of God, or is it the calculating and convenient adoption of things which we are persuaded are in harmony with the collective unconscious? Is our practice simply the expression of those things we believe subjectively to be psychologically helpful? These are questions of fundamental importance. An example may be cited. Mr. Cope thinks that there are sound psychological grounds for acquiescing in the worship of the Queen of Heaven. "The one person



of Mary as virgin, mother and queen, provides a focus of devotion for all those who psychologically are unsatisfied by a Godhead conceived solely in masculine terms." (p. 169). Again: "We who belong to parts of the Church where regard for Mary is neglected or ignored or sentimentalised would do well to . . . seek ways of recognising the feminine aspects of the Godhead . . . There are many people who . . . long for a feminine mediatrix to plead their cause with the stern Judge . . . We are all confronted by the problem of how to apprehend the 'personality' of the Godhead, and if some Christians experience the divine love partly in feminine terms, the duty of those who do not is no more than to try to keep regard for the Queen of Heaven within the bounds of what is seemly" (pp. 163-164). To which we can only say that this is pernicious nonsense and blasphemous heresy.

This book graphically illustrates both the delights and the dangers of a Jungian approach to holy Scriptures. Symbolism by all means, but let us test and correct our symbolism by humble submission to revealed truth.

S. BARTON BABBAGE.

### JESUS AND THE SERVANT

By Morna D. Hooker (S.P.C.K. London) 1959, pp. 230; 27/6.

The sub-title of this useful study is "the influence of the Servant concept of deutero-Isaiah in the New Testament"; and Miss Hooker states her subject as follows:

"The real problem is to discover at what point the identification of Jesus with the Servant came into Christian thought: whether it was inherent in the teaching of Jesus, or whether it was introduced by the Church to explain his death; and if the latter, at what stage this was done."

One does not need to agree with all Miss Hooker's conclusions on every point of detail to be extremely grateful for what she has done in organising and in examining systematically these questions.

The treatment is thorough. After two chapters of a more summary character in which recent work on the problem is brought under survey, and the Servant passages discussed, we have a useful discussion of the Jewish interpretation of the Servant followed by some careful work on "The Servant in the Synoptic Gospels." This last must be regarded as containing the central point of Miss Hooker's thesis. She examines in detail fifteen passages which are said to contain allusions to the Servant, and comes to the conclusion that "there is very little in the Synoptics to support the traditional view that Jesus identified his mission with that of the Servant Songs . . . Jesus speaks in a general way of the fact that his death was foretold in the prophets, and there is nothing to indicate that he thought that these prophecies were confined to two passages in the book of Isaiah: indeed, where particular passages are indicated, as happens twice (Mark xii. 10 f. and xiv. 27), there are quotations, not from Isaiah, but from quite different contexts."

In the next long chapter Miss Hooker examines in turn those passages in the rest of the New Testament which are said to support a Servant Christology. Her conclusions are surprisingly negative:

"In the writings of the theologians of the early Church, we found little evidence that the identification of Jesus with the Servant played any great part in the thinking of St. Paul, St. John, or the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and no *proof* that it was known to them at all."

The great exception to this is I Peter which, like Acts viii, applies

the fourth Servant Song to Jesus, but I Peter goes beyond any other New Testament passage in using this image to illuminate the experience of divine forgiveness through the sufferings of Christ.

Perhaps one may suggest that sometimes Miss Hooker's analytical method is a little too cold and unimaginative. For instance there is more to be said about Phil. ii: 5-11 than is here discussed. That hymn, surprisingly enough, contains very few echoes of the Greek O.T.: here is little actual Septuagintal language. So the method of linguistic analysis has its limitations in this case. Nevertheless it is at least possible to suggest that the phrase *and being found in likeness as a man he humbled himself* both directly owes something to Isaiah liii: 8, and indirectly through the Rabbinic interpretation of Isaiah liii in the light of Ur-Mensch speculations (see Lohmeyer in *New Testament Problems* ed. Lowther Clarke, 1929) is related to it. In general terms, it is possible (indeed certain) that concepts which we isolate by our analytical method, and then keep separate, were held together in the imagination of the man—Christian, Jewish, pagan—of the 1st Century.

The effect of Miss Hooker's enquiry is not, however, finally negative; for she shows that Jesus's awareness of his own vocation as set forth in the Synoptic Gospels, and the early Church's appreciation of the role of suffering in that vocation have a wider and deeper basis in the divine election, and owe more to the decisive reinterpretation of the Son of Man concept by Jesus himself, than those whose Christology is too exclusive stated in terms of the Servant would often suggest. This book deserves to go on our shelves beside the transcribed word study of Zimmerli and Jeremias.

J. D. McCAUGHEY.

#### A CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

By George A. F. Knight (S.C.M. Press, London), 1959, pp. 383; 30/-.

One must note particularly the word "Christian" in the title of this book, for this is the clue as to why it is altogether different in its approach to the OT from what has been regarded for a couple of generations or more as "OT Theology," e.g. the standard English volume by A. B. Davidson. This book does not set out to make an objective study of the religious ideas of ancient Israel. On the contrary, the author starts from the premise that the OT, being part of the Christian Scriptures must be read "within the walls of the Christian Church," and is just as important a possession of the Church as the NT (a contention which most Christian scholars probably doubt even though they do not always say so). The author studies the OT from the viewpoint of the Christian believer, and seeks to hear the living Word of God in the OT, and to understand its unique contribution to the revelation of God contained therein.

This does not mean that the author ignores the conclusions of literary criticism, and returns to the ancient methods of typology and allegory, or treats the OT merely as a source-book for Messianic references. On the contrary, he makes full use of the assured results of literary criticism, but takes another very important step forward. For while literary criticism and the objective historical study of Israel's religion offered much to the scholar, they offered little, as such, to the Christian preacher. Biblical theology attempts to bridge this gap. This book is a very good example of it, and is more comprehensive than any other book known to the reviewer which has so far appeared in English.

Former OT "Theologies" reflected the tradition divisions of



systematic Theology. Here they are almost completely abandoned. The work is divided into four parts of which the first and the last are the longest: I God, II God and Creation, III God and Israel, IV The Zeal of the Lord. In the first section the author deals with the nature and substance of divine revelation in the OT, and shows how this involves a knowledge of the Hebrew understanding of man. Part III is a study of Israel, called out of Egypt by God to be His Son, through whom the divine redemptive purpose for the world would be effected. The author discerns five "moments" in Israel's experience, the call from Egypt, the covenant at Sinai, the Fall of Judah, the return from Exile, which he likens to birth, marriage, death and resurrection, and the fifth moment is in the final consummation yet to come.

Though the order in which the material is presented may sometimes appear arbitrary, there is no doubt about the value of the material itself, both for the student of the scriptures, and above all for the preacher of the Word. Technical language cannot be wholly avoided in a work like this, but it is kept down to a minimum, in the hope that it will be read by the ordinary intelligent churchman. Hebrew words are transliterated for the assistance of the non-Hebrew student. This is a book which can be warmly recommended to all, for it should achieve a great deal in opening up the Old Testament in a living and meaningful way.

Brisbane.

L. G. GEERING.

#### THIS IS MY BODY

Luther's Contention for the Real Presence in the Sacrament of the Altar. By Herman Sasse (Augsburg Publishing House, Minneapolis), 1959, pp. 420; \$7.00.

The name of the author of this important study on the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord's Supper is certainly not unknown to the regular readers of this journal. Dr. Sasse has contributed many valuable articles in which he has proved himself a theologian of a very high standard. As a matter of fact, before coming to Australia, where since 1949 he has served on the faculty of Immanuel Theological Seminary in North Adelaide, he was already a scholar of European fame. In 1933 he was appointed to the chair of Church History, History of Doctrine and Symbolics at the University of Erlangen (Germany). In the great struggle of the German Churches against the pseudo-religious and totalitarian claims of Nazism he was—with Karl Barth and others—one of the leaders. We here in Australia may count it a great honour and privilege to have a theologian of this stature in our midst and we hope that Professor Sasse will be allowed to give us and the entire English speaking theological world more works of the same high standard as the one under review here.

This work first of all purports to be a study in the field of the history of doctrine, as the subtitle already indicates. As far as I know we do not possess such an elaborate and exhaustive study of the Lutheran position from the point of the history of doctrine in the English language. Actually this book is too rich to summarise it in a few lines. It must suffice to mention the headings of the chapters only, with a few additional remarks. The first chapter deals with the medieval background. I must say that I have seldom read such a concise and yet instructive summary of the development of this doctrine in the Middle Ages. Then there follow two chapters on Luther in his Early Period and on Zwingli. Chapter 4, The Great Controversy,

is an introduction to what is meant as the core of the book: the Marburg Colloquy. In a chapter of over one hundred pages the author gives an extensive, verbatim reconstruction of this famous colloquy. In Chapter 6, the Aftermath, we are confronted with the attempts of Bucer, Melanchthon and Calvin to build a bridge between the two positions. In the Formula of Concord the Lutheran Churches rejected all these attempts as insufficient and confirmed the original Lutheran doctrine. In a final chapter Dr. Sasse discusses the present-day situation. Has the confession become obsolete on this point? Has the more recent exegesis of the New Testament proved that the Lutheran position is untenable? The answer is a clear No. The Real Presence is not only deeply rooted in the NT itself, according to the author, but it is still of the greatest spiritual importance for the present-day Church.

As a Reformed theologian one is, of course, time and again tempted to interrupt the author and ask him some questions. I must confess that the margins of my review copy are full of exclamation marks, question marks and shorter or longer notes. However, it is not possible in a review like this to enter into a full discussion on the Lutheran doctrine itself. I was impressed by Luther's great love of and reverence for this 'sacramentum sacramentorum.' How all-important this sacrament was for the Reformer; And not only for him, but for all those who took part in these controversies, both theologians and 'common' people. (Cf. also the struggle in Bohemia in the Late Middle Ages, pp. 70ff.). Further Dr. Sasse proves conclusively, that it is not correct to say that the theory of consubstantiation is the binding doctrine of the Lutheran Church. (Cf. also J. L. Neve, *Introduction to the Symbolical Books of the Lutheran Church*, 1956, 214ff.). I am not convinced, whether his thesis on the "theory" of ubiquity as not confessionally binding (cf. 155ff., 321, 340ff.) can be upheld in the light of what the Formula Concordiae itself says. Then, is there indeed a contrast between Luther and Calvin concerning the real heresy of the R.C. doctrine, as Dr. Sasse suggests on p. 87? Calvin, too, in his *Instit.* IV, XVIII, 1, calls the sacrificial idea the 'most pestilential error'; cf. also Luther's own order in *De Captivitate Babylonica* (Luther's Works, American Edition, Vol. 36, 1959, p. 27, 28, 35). Is it correct to connect the denial of the Real Presence (in the Lutheran sense) time and again with rationalistic motives? (Cf. e.g. 33, 359). In some cases, e.g. Zwingli and Melanchthon, a rationalistic attitude is present, but as a general statement it seems to be a simplification of the problem. In my opinion, the author has not proved either, that a spiritual conception of the Lord's Supper is, at least in principle, bound to destroy the Incarnation (cf. 316, 360).

All these remarks do not mean to derogate from the true greatness of this work. They are meant only as evidence of the great interest with which the present writer has read this volume. On the whole I cannot but admire the way in which Dr. Sasse has written about this controversial subject. For example, his rendering of Calvin's view is very fair. Here we do not meet with a caricature, as is so often the case, but in its brevity it is a faithful account of Calvin's teachings. Yet I wonder, whether the author has penetrated far enough into Calvin's mind and spirit. Perhaps we are asking too much. And yet this is the only possibility of coming to a fair judgment of some one's views, as the author himself has shown us so admirably in the case of Luther. When e.g. Dr. Sasse says that for Calvin, just as for Zwingli, the sacrament is not a means, but only a sign of grace (p. 328), this is certainly contrary to Calvin's own utterances and intentions. Calvin himself did not shrink back from calling the

sacraments 'instruments' of grace (cf. C.R. VIII, 695), though at the same time denying that they are channels of grace. Undoubtedly there is here a difference as to the meaning of the term. Dr. Sasse uses the phrase 'means of grace' in a sense, different from the Reformed conception. From his own view on the sacraments he qualifies (c.q. limits) the meaning of the term and then measures the Reformed conception by it. This method, however, is bound to lead to a conclusion which is not warranted by the Reformed doctrine. Rejecting an amalgamation of the sign and the matter signified, Calvin always maintained an inseparable conjunction, and in this conjunction the sacrament is more than a mere sign only, but is indeed a *signum efficax* (Thirty-nine Articles XXV), and as such functions as a means of grace (Cf. Westm. Conf. XXVII, 3 "The grace . . . is exhibited in or by the sacraments").

Though compelled to disagree with Professor Sasse, one feels at the same time a deepening sense of gratitude towards this able author for a work both instructive and intensely stimulating.

K. RUNIA.

#### L'EUCCHARISTIE

By Max Thurian (Delachaux et Niestle, Neuchatel), 1959, pp. 278; Fr. 8.50.

#### LA CONFIRMATION

By Max Thurian (Delachaux et Niestle, Neuchatel), 1957, pp. 120; Fr. 4.50.

#### MARRIAGE AND CELIBACY

By Max Thurian (S.C.M. Press, London), 1959, pp. 126; 8/6.

These three books come out of an unusual background, the Community of Taizé. Theological learning owes much to the labours of men in Roman Catholic and Anglican communities such, for example, as the Society of the Sacred Mission at Kelham. The Reformed Church has not taken to community life, or has produced anomalies like the Iona Community, which has little in common with those others. The Community of Taizé, however, is a Reformed Community of the same type as the Roman and Anglican, a company of men who have accepted the full life of a religious community with vows of poverty, celibacy and obedience. It is good to see they also maintain the tradition of sound theological learning. These three books are all from the pen of Max Thurian, a member of the Community, who has also written an introduction to the liturgical life and a book on Confession. All these show that he is an accomplished scholar, familiar with the best literature and especially the contemporary discussions in French, German and English. For example, the bibliography appended to the little book on Confirmation provides a very complete guide to the discussions on the subject which have been going on over the past fifteen years.

Of the three, the book on the Eucharist is by far the largest and most important. Published on the four hundredth anniversary of the first Synod of the Reformed Church in France in 1559, its aim is eirenic and ecumenical and it seeks to bring to the notice of Reformed pastors and theologians certain aspects of the eucharist which are more characteristic of the catholic than the protestant outlook. In a short preface Max Thurian explains his aim and method. His aim is to stir up the faithful believers to an enthusiasm for the holy supper and its traditional liturgy with a view to encouraging their more understanding, more frequent and more fruitful participation in it. His method is through the cross-fertilisation of biblical study and liturgical practice. This, he maintains, was the method of



the Early Fathers and it saves theology from an arid intellectualism and brings it into salutary relationship to the church's pastoral task. After a brief introduction in which he summarises, with great skill, the main lines of theological discussion on the nature of the sacrament from the Reformation to the Lund Conference on Faith and Order in 1952, the author continues, "In order to understand the action of Christ in the holy supper, which implies His Real Presence, we must understand afresh what He desired in instituting this sacrament, and particularly what He wished to say in giving us the command to repeat the celebration until His return: 'This do in memory of Me'." The rest of the book falls into two equal parts. In the first Max Thurian goes through the Old Testament, especially its liturgical texts, in search of every scrap of information that may throw light on the significance of the term *anamnesis*, 'memorial'. In the second he pursues this research through the New Testament. Then, after a long and thorough study of the words of Christ at the last supper, he turns to consider the eucharistic sacrifice and the Real Presence of Christ in the sacrament in the light of all that has been learnt on the way. While one may have legitimate doubts as to whether the author does not over-press the evidence at times, no one can fail to profit from this careful study and have his understanding of this divine mystery of our Faith enriched by it. I can wish for it many readers.

The second book, on Confirmation, is an excellent contribution to the debate on the nature and significance of confirmation which has been going on since the end of the war. Max Thurian's aim here is to establish the sacramental character of the rite, which, in the Reformed Church, has been regarded as no more than a public confession of faith and the acceptance of certain more or less defined religious obligations. To ministers, puzzled as so many of them are what to make of confirmation, this study, which comes to the conclusion that "confirmation ought to be the normal liturgical act by which a Christian binds himself to service in the Church and receives a renewal of the Holy Spirit," offers real help.

The last book, translated into English, is on "Marriage and Celibacy," with eighteen pages devoted to "The Vocation of Marriage," and eighty to "The Vocation of Celibacy." While the dictum "Christian marriage and Christian celibacy are equal states" can only be supported by some special pleading and shaky exegesis, there is much in this book which both married and single would be the better of considering and it is a wholesome and refreshing change from the turgid streams of banal eroticism which flood the bookshops.

There is a small but significant testimony to the essential Protestantism of these works. On the fly-leaf instead of the 'Nihil obstat', there is a brief note which affirms that this work of research is not theologically binding on the Community of Taizé!

JOHN HENDERSON.

### SHORTER NOTICES

*Lectures on Revivals*, by W. B. Sprague (Banner of Truth Trust, London, 25/- Aust.) Published first in the U.S.A. in 1832, this work endeavours to elucidate the marks of a genuine revival of religion as being effected by scriptural means, characterised by a due proportion of reflection and feeling and evidencing a substantial and abiding fruit. A large appendix of twenty letters relating to the subject from contemporary American Church leaders is added. The two longest epistles by Samuel Miller and Ashbel Green, both of Princeton, are of special interest with their illuminating comments on "Camp-meetings" and

"Anxious Seats." Altogether the sane and discriminating discussion contained within this volume is most relevant for the appraisal of contemporary evangelistic methods and techniques.

*A Body of Divinity and The Ten Commandments*, by Thomas Watson (Banner of Truth Trust, 13/6 Aust. each.) These embody a reprint of sermons on the Westminster Shorter Catechism (to be completed in 1960 by a third volume on "The Lord's Prayer") by one of the most distinguished preachers ejected by the Act of Uniformity. With a ready command of both sacred and profane learning these discourses manifest theological insight, homilistic acumen and pastoral concern. Watson was a master of striking aphorism. E.g., "God has married mankind to Himself; the angels are Christ's friends, not His spouse"; "God has given us two ears, but one tongue, to show that we should be swift to hear, but slow to speak."

*A Goodly Heritage*, Papers read at the Puritan Studies Conference, 1958 (Banner of Truth Trust, 2/6). In the Foreword Dr. J. I. Packer writes that modern Evangelicalism urgently needs to learn from the Puritans as "the classic pastors and teachers of Protestantism." There follows shortened versions of six varied and informative papers:—"The Life and Work of a Minister according to the Puritans" (P. Cook); "The Puritans as Interpreters of Scripture" (J. I. Packer); "William Guthrie on the Trial of a Saving Interest in Christ" (D. Mingard); "Divine Sovereignty in the Thoughts of Stephen Charnock" (F. K. Drayson); "Richard Baxter's Social and Economic Teaching" (D. R. Wooldridge); "Morgan Llwyd" (G. Gruffyd).

*Illustrations from Biblical Archaeology*, by D. J. Wiseman (Tyndale, London, 11/6) "seeks to present those items which directly relate to both Testaments, together with selections of those which generally illustrate some aspects of the biblical era" (p. 6). The author, an expert in the archaeology of the Near East, admirably attains his objectives in this brief survey which is amply and effectively photographically illustrated. A serviceable bibliography for further study is appended.

*The Story of the Reformation*, by William Stevenson (John Knox Press, Richmond, Va., \$3.50). Written by an Edinburgh minister, in this notable quarter-centenary in the Geneva-Calvin-Knox tradition, this comprehensive and balanced survey (commended by Dr. John Baillie in his Foreword) provides an excellent popular presentation of its subject.

R. Swanton.

#### PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

(Mention here neither precludes nor implies subsequent comment).

Banner of Truth, London: *The Epistle to the Romans*, Robert Haldane, 25/- Aust.; *The Christian Ministry*, Charles Bridges, 22/6 Aust.

Eerdmans, Grand Rapids: *Biblical Exegesis in the Qumran Texts and The Defence of the Gospel in the New Testament*, F. F. Bruce, \$2.50 and \$1.50; *The Witness of Matthew and Mark to Christ* (2nd ed.), N. B. Stonehouse, \$3.00 (1st ed. reviewed, May, 1945, pp. 44-7); *Darius the Mede*, by J. C. Whitcomb Jr., \$2.75; *Faith and its Difficulties*, J. H. Bavinck, \$2.00; *Champion of Geneva* (A Sketch of John Calvin for Young People), Peter de Rover, \$0.35; *The Imputation of Adam's Sin*, John Murray, \$2.00; *Beneath the Cross of Jesus*, R. E. O. White, \$3.00.



Joint Board of Graded Lessons, Melbourne: *The Faith of the Church* (Report of a Joint Commission on Church Union), 2/6.

Hawthorn Kirk Session, Melbourne: *The Metrical Psalms*, F. Maxwell Bradshaw and *The Lord's Day*, R. Swanton, 1/- each.

Inter-Varsity Fellowship, London: *The Mystery of Suffering*, H. E. Hopkins, 3/6; *Conversions Psychological and Spiritual and Studies in the Sermon on the Mount*, Martyn Lloyd-Jones, 2/- and 15/-; *Let Wisdom Judge* (University Addresses and Sermon Outlines by Charles Simeon), ed. A. Pollard, 9/6; *What is Life?*, M. Dixon, 9d.

John Knox Press, Richmond, Va.: *The Fulfilment of Life*, O. M. Wetherly, \$3.00; *God in the Eternal Present*, C. G. Howie, \$2.25; *In His Likeness*, G. M. Bryan, \$3.00.

Les Presses de Taize, Taize, France: *Vivre L'Aujourd'hui de Dieu*, Roger Schutz, Fr. 540.

Seraphic Press: Milwaukee, Wis.: *The Notion of Tradition in John Driedo*, \$3.00.

S.C.M., London: *A Shorter Commentary on Romans*, Karl Barth, 15/-; *Church Music and Theology*, Erik Routley, 8/6; *Human Culture and the Holy*, Jaroslav Pelikan, 15/- (American ed., *Fools for Christ*, reviewed Vol. XV, p. 28); *Amos and Micah*, John Marsh, 8/6; *A New Quest of the Historical Jesus*, James M. Robinson, 9/6; *Irreligious Reflections on the Christian*, Werner Pelz, 8/6; *The Liturgical Movement and the Local Church*, A. R. Shands, 8/6; *On Being a Technolgoist*, D. G. Christopherson, 2/6; *The Educated Man Today and To-morrow*, John Wolfenden, 2/6; *Difficulties in Christian Belief*, A. C. MacIntyre, 8/6; *Out of Every Nation*, R. K. Orchard, 5/-; *The Gospel and Renascent Hinduism*, P. D. Devanandan, 4/-; *God's Kingdom and Ours*, Gabriel Hebert, 10/6; *The People of God*, D. G. Miller, 8/6; *Religion and the Scientists*, ed. M. Stockwood, 5/-; *Problems of Religious Knowledge*, Peter Munz, 25/-; *The Forgiveness of Sins*, W. Telfer, 12/6; *The Pressure of our Common Calling*, W. A. Visser't Hooft, 12/6; *Sandals at the Mosque*, by K. Cragg, 12/6; *The New Translations of the Bible*, E. H. Robertson, 10/6; *The Epistle to the Galatians*, John A. Allan, 9/6; *The Gospel according to St. John*, Alan Richardson, 12/6.

S.P.C.K. London: *Hebrews and the Scriptures*, F. C. Synge, 7/6.

Tyndale, London: *The Acts of the Apostles*, E. M. Blaiklock, 9/6; *The First Epistle of Peter*, A. M. Stibbs, 8/6; *The Witness of Matthew and Mark to Christ*, 2nd ed., 11/6 (see above); *The Praying Christ*, J. G. S. S. Thomson, 10/6.

Zondervan, Grand Rapids: *The Berkely Version in Modern English* (2nd ed.), ed. Gerrit Verkuyl, \$7.95; *How to Win over Worry*, J. E. Haggai, \$2.95; *Woman to Woman*, E. Price, \$2.95.

Zwingli, Zürich: *Die Verklarung Jesu*, Heinrich Baltensweiler, Fr. 18.



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